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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
court then concluded that its function was not to substitute its judgment
for that of the Board on these factual issues, but rather to determine from
the evidence presented whether the Board's decision is unreasonable or
unlawful.
The current position of the Tax Commissioner regarding the taxabil-
ity of packaging and wrapping materials was set forth in a letter from
the Tax Commissioner dated August 25, 1960.' The Department of
Taxation has taken the position that the tax applies to "purchases of ma-
terial, the purpose of which is to facilitate, or make convenient, the ship-
ment of products."24 In his letter the Commissioner recognizes that cer-
tain manufacturing, assembling, processing, and refining operations re-
sult in a packaged product in which the package is incorporated as part
of the product. However, the Commissioner distinguishes this from
other operations "which result in a finished product which may subse-
quently be packed, packaged, or otherwise adapted to convenient han-
dling, storage, or shipment."2
FRED SIEGEL
TORTS
INTRODUCTION
The bulk of significant tort decisions during the current survey period
have fallen into two major categories. First, cases concerning care of the
sick and disabled, and second, actions arising out of the incident of own-
ership or possession of real property.
CARE OF THE SICK AND DISABLED
With respect to the first of these two categories some comment is
appropriate with regard to the growing number of tort actions that are
being instituted both against the individual physician and the hospital.
The scope of this trend is not limited to Ohio nor to a particular geo-
graphical area, but rather is nationwide in its impact. The legal pro-
fession has been sharply criticized by physicians and medical organiza-
tions for its role in this type of litigation.1 A more thoughtful analysis
of the problem indicates that the condition is more the result of the
inter-play of several outside forces rather than a clearly defined causal
relationship, as the prognostication might indicate. One of the several
23. Reported in 2 CCH OHIO TAX REP. 5 60-216 (1960).
24. See United States Steel Corp. v. Bowers, 170 Ohio St. 558, 167 N.E.2d 87 (1960).
25. This letter construes OHIO REv. CODE § 5739.01.
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factors to be considered is the effect of the various national mass media
on the "image" of the medical profession. At present there appears to
be a correlation between derogatory themes directed against the medical
practitioners and institutions and the increase in the frequency of re-
quests for legal counseling in pressing actions for malpractice. As the
"image" has altered over the last quarter century so has the required
standard of care necessary to discharge the physician's duty to his patient.
Today the prevailing attitude assumes that all error is culpable, and for
every error or omission someone must pay. The attitude is synonymous
with that which had its inception over a century ago, respondeat superior,
the able master must pay.
It is apparent that any unjustified financial exposure to the physician
and the resulting encumbrance upon medical research must be judi-
ciously limited in the best interests of society. This requires the utmost
in judicial darity in defining tort liability and the level of care necessary
to discharge the physicians' duty. Current developments in the areas of
diagnosis and treatment have made the label "malpractice" obsolete by
their complexities. A more definitive term is "errors and omissions."
It conveys a less onerous meaning in that it is not as prejudicial to the
defendant's rights and reputation and at the same time is more specific in
that it allows a dearer and more concise delineation of the errors charged.
Such a phrase might well be substituted in the best interests of justice
and fair play.
Cause of Action - Plaintiff's Rights and the
Statute of Limitations
Against this very general setting it is no wonder that the medical
profession in Ohio has received with some concern the appellate court's
decision in Stidam v. Ashmore.' This was a case of first impression on
the subject of whether a mother has a cause of action for the wrongful
death of her viable unborn child, subsequently stillborn due to the
alleged negligence of the attending physician. A demurrer to the plain-
tiff's petition had been sustained, and the petition then dismissed by the
trial court. Prior to this time Ohio had recognized a cause of action for
injuries sustained by an unborn child3 and an administrator's right to
bring an action for the wrongful death of a child born alive who sub-
sequently succumbed from prenatal injuries.4 In reversing the trial
1. A selective, but by no means exhaustive, survey by the author of medical journals over
the past year indicates that scarcely an issue of general circulation reaches the physician's
desk that does not contain an indictment of the legal profession for their diligence in pursuing
malpractice claims.
2. 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
3. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
4. Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
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court's ruling on the demurrer the court of appeals declared, in a most
persuasive opinion, that it would be illogical to cut off a right of redress
merely because death preceded delivery. In effect the court has said that
it will no longer refuse to hear these cases on policy grounds, but will
allow the plaintiff to present his case despite the complexity of the burden
of proof. More than any case reported during the survey period this
decision reflects a growth in the law.
A different legal-medical question was presented by the facts in
Corpman v. Boyer.5  Presented on appeal was the sole question of
whether a cause of action instituted by a husband to recover damages for
his wife's medical expenses and the loss of consortium and services, is
governed by the one-year statute of limitations for bringing malpractice
suits,6 or the four-year "catch-all" statute.' The operation had been per-
formed on the plaintiff's spouse on December 9, 1955 and the action was
not brought until October 17, 1958. In determining the statute of limi-
tations question the court had to pass on the issue of whether a husband's
claim for medical expenses and loss of services and consortium is a cause
of action "growing out of," "founded upon" or "for" malpractice. The
majority of the court speaking through Judge Peck found that "The
statute itself describes the limited action as one 'for' malpractice .... "'
Hence the one-year limitation did not apply to the facts of the instant
case. In arriving at its decision the court overruled the decision of the
Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Cramer v. Price,9 which had
held that a similar action by the husband was to be regarded as an
action "for" malpractice, subject to the one-year "unfavored" statute of
limitations.' ° In concluding its opinion the supreme court cited its pre-
vious pronouncement in Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital," which had
been decided some three months earlier. This was a wrongful death
action brought against the hospital for the alleged negligence of a foreign
trained physician who was serving in the capacity of a "resident in
anesthesia."'" As this case relates to the previous case commented upon,
the court held that the action was rightfully brought as a wrongful death
5. 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N..2d 14 (1960). See also discussion in Civil Procedure section,
p. 456 supra.
6. OMO REa. CODE § 2305.11.
7. Omo REv. CODE § 2305.09(D).
8. 171 Ohio St. 233, 234, 169 N.E.2d 14, 15 (1960).
9. 84 Ohio App. 255, 82 N.E.2d 874 (1958).
10. See also Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936). See discus-
sion in Civil Procedure section, p. 457 supra.
11. 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960). See also discussion in Civil Procedure sec-
tion, p. 457 supra.
12. It should be noted that the court did not consider it controlling that the resident was
admitted to practice medicine in Italy but not in Ohio.
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action to which the two-year statute of limitations applied, and could
not be dassified as a malpractice action. However, the court stressed
heavily the fact that if the deceased had brought an action for the in-
juries he had sustained, it would have been a malpractice action to which
the one-year statute would have applied, regardless of whether the plain-
tiff's action had sounded in contract or tort.1
From an analysis of these cases it would appear that there are three
distinct "bundles of rights," the violation of which will support a cause
of action against the physician or the hospital. To the extent that these
three groups may be described in terms of the statute of limitations
which applies to the commencement of each, they are:
(1) An action for malpractice by the injured party for his personal
loss and suffering. The injured party has one year in which to initiate
the action after he is discharged by the physician or after he terminates
the doctor-patient relationship himself. In either case should death sub-
sequently intervene after the action is filed or when the action is timely
filed, the proceeds go to the decedents estate for the benefit of the
creditors.
(2) An action for expenses sustained by the husband or wife in
caring for the deceased spouse plus compensation for loss of conjugal
relations and loss of services.15 This action may be brought by the wife
or husband within four years of the date of the alleged negligent act.'"
(3) An action for the wrongful death of the deceased by the per-
sonal representative within two years, for the benefit of the class of sur-
vivors set forth in the statute.'
In the Klema case after deciding the action was not barred by the
statute the court then turned to the question of whether a hospital could
be held liable for the negligent act of an employee performing a "medical
act" rather than an "administrative act." Judge Bell held that it is im-
practical to distinguish between "medical" and "administrative" acts,
the proper test being whether the person committing the act was an
employee functioning within the scope of his employment." Although
this result may seem unduly severe at times, it does have the advantage
13. 170 Ohio St. 519, 521, 166 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1960); see also OHIo REV. CODE §
2125.01.
14. Id. at 525, 166 N.E.2d at 771; see also OHIo REV. CODE S 2125.02.
15. It should be noted that Ohio does not recognize a right in the wife to sue for loss of
consortium.
16. Qmaerae: Where costly prescribed post-operative care follows the operation, and the alleged
negligent act which resulted from a faulty diagnosis causes disability, may the husband be
compensated for such care and the loss of consortium and services during the entire period in
which the patient was under the physician's care?
17. Omo REV. CODE S 2125.02.
18. Klema v, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960); see Bing
y. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N..2d 3 (1957).
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of certainty and provides a basis for advising hospitals on the amount of
proper coverage to obtain.
Errors and Omissions by the Registered Nurse
Davis v. Eubanks9 held that a registered nurse employed by a hospital
but administering treatment to a patient, under the direction of the pa-
tient's physician, is a professional person. The court found that there was
ample legislative history to support the proposition that a registered nurse
"'is engaged in a profession,"20 and is no less of a professional person be-
cause she is employed by an institution. It also found that section
2305.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, the malpractice statute of limitations,
is applicable to actions brought against a nurse acting in her professional
capacity. Here the court relied on the following definition of malprac-
tice taken from Bouvier's Law Dictionary:
Bad or unskillful practice in... or other professional person, whereby
the health of a patient is injured... .21
Thus, it would seem that there is no reason why the statute should not
apply to the nurse whose alleged act of malpractice preceded the com-
mencement of the suit by a period of more than a year. It removes the
doctor's shield of protection from the registered nurse who is perform-
ing services which a doctor would otherwise perform. However, there
are grounds for disputing the court's conclusion that if the action against
the servant is barred, a derivative action against the master is similarly
prohibited, in the absence of proof that the master was negligent in the
selection and retention of the servant. Although malpractice is a dis-
favored action, it is in society's best interests that a tortiously injured
party be compensated, and although the actor may be immune from
suit the culpability of the act still exists. In a number of cases the courts
have held that the immunity of the servant does not extend to the
master.22 In the face of recent supreme court decisions and with the
widespread availability of liability insurance it seems wholly unjustified
to extend this immunity to the hospitals. Another argument against this
defense goes to the basic reasons why malpractice is a disfavored action.
Certainly a close confidential relationship between hospital and patient
can not be purported to exist nor does the patient in submitting to the
ministrations of a nurse have the occasion to reflect on the qualifications
of the individual, as he would in the normal physician-patient relation-
ship. Further, it can not be asserted that the action brought against the
19. 167 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
20. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 4723.01-14.
21. 2 BouviER'S LAw DICTIONARY 2587 (8th ed. 1914).
22. See MEcIEM, OuTLINES ON AGENcY §§ 421-23 (4th ed. 1952) for an excellent dis-
cussion of the subject.
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hospital wotild serve to injure its reputation to the extent that the same
action would if brought against the nurse. Since Ohio has adopted the
view that a hospital incorporated as a nonprofit corporation is liable for
the torts of its servants,2. ' it seems there is little justification for deny-
ing recovery in the case commented upon.
Dual Standards of Care For Doctors and Interns
A rather inauspicious case is Rush v. Akron General Hospital.4 This
appellate decision indicates a dual standard for foreign doctors practicing
as interns in Ohio as opposed to Ohio physicians in the same hospital.
This unfortunate case arose from the plaintiff's admission to the hospital
emergency ward following an altercation which saw him propelled
through a. glass door. Upon arrival at the hospital the patient was
treated by the doctor-intern who inadvertently left a three and one half
inch fragment of glass in the plaintiff's wound. Upon trial the follow-
ing interrogatories were submitted to the jury:
Question: Do you find that the defendant was negligent? Answer: Yes.
Question: If your answer to interrogatory No. 1 is "Yes" state in what
respect or respects the defendant was negligent. Answer: The defend-
ant was negligent to the extent that the wound was sufficiently large
to warrant calling the senior doctor in charge to examine the patient. 25
Following entry of judgment upon the verdict, the court, upon mo-
tion of the defendant, entered final judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. The disquieting aspect of the appellate opinion, which affirmed the
lower court, is that after commenting on evidence advanced in the course
of the trial to the effect that the "ministrations of the intern show no
deviation from the standard of care, diligence or skill employed in the
examination and treatment of such cases.., in this community," Judge
Doyle speaking for the court observed:
It would be unreasonable to exact from an intern.., that high degree
of skill which is impliedly possessed by a physician and surgeon in
the general practice of his profession, with an extensive and constant
practice in hospitals and the community. 6
Cognizance should be taken that the party referred to is a doctor licensed
to practice medicine in another state and only his failure to take ad-
vantage of Ohio's reciprocity statute' prevented him from becoming a
physician in Ohio. He was presumably held out to the community on a
23. Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 NX.E.2d 410 (1956).
24. 84 Ohio L. Abs. 292 (Ct. App. 1957).
25. Id. at 293.
26. Id. at 295.
27. OHio Rv. CODE § 4731.27.
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"24-hour tour of duty" to serve patients coming to the hospital's emer-
gency room. Concluding its opinion the court went on to say:
What is required in the case of an intern is that he shall possess such
skill and use such care and diligence in the handling of emergency cases
as capable medical college graduates serving hospitals as interns ordi-
narily possess under similar circumstances .... Y
This may be the subjective standard used by the jury in reaching its ver-
dict. It is extremely doubtful that it is the objective standard used by
the majority of the courts on appeal. The standard on appeal would
seem to be that standard of care exercised by doctors in the community
with consideration being given to the care which this profession would
exercise in the same or a like situation. While the law does recognize
that there are different schools of medicine, there would seem to be
little justification in creating still another category, that of interns in the
same or similar localities.
Treatment In Absentia
A final case in the medical-legal area presented the question of
whether a hospital can be held liable for the refusal of its staff to per-
form certain acts in connection with the care of a patient where no
authority to do so has been given the hospital or staff by the surgeon
in charge. The facts in Shutts v. Siehl" do not suggest anything un-
usual apart from the fact that the surgeon who had operated on the
patient had temporarily absented himself from the community after first
satisfying himself that the patient was convalescing in a satisfactory manner.
The record disclosed that the patient had made requests for medication
for his discomfort prior to and after the doctor's departure and that the
defendant hospital had made reasonable efforts to ascertain the nature of
that discomfort. However, since no specific instructions regarding medi-
cations out of the norm had been given such steps were not taken. In
such a case where the nature of the condition is something short of an
emergency the hospital is clearly in a dilemma. May they on their own
depart from the treatment prescribed or must they first secure the permis-
sion of the physician if this is reasonably feasible under the existing facts?
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County would ap-
pear to affirm the fact that the selection of a specific line of treatment is
still in the hands of the attending physician.
28. Rush v. Akron General Hospital, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 292, 295 (Ct. App. 1957).
29. 109 Ohio App. 145, 164 N.E.2d 443 (1959).
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Hospital Immzpity i& Ohio
Gibbon v. YWCA"0 has been given thorough treatment in other
articles."' In that case the court found no compelling reasons to remove
the charitable immunity from a YWCA, as it had done from hospitals in
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital-" Of concern here is the scope of para-
graph one of the court's syllabus which recites as follows:
A charitable or eleemosynary institution, other than one which has as
its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, as a matter
of public policy not liable for tortious injury except (1) when the
injured person is not a beneficiary of the institution, and (2) when a
beneficiary suffers harm as a result of failure of the institution to exer-
cise due care in the selection or retention of an employee.33
This statement by implication would seem to delineate the scope of the
court's 1956 holding in Avellone, which provided that a suitable defini-
tion can be arrived at as to what constitutes a "hospital" in keeping with
the underlying considerations of current cases. Certainly the small
suburban clinic or nursing home are no less hospitals simply because
they operate under different names. Indeed, support for this position
cgn be found in Judge Putnam's dissent in the Avellone case:
Although the instant case involve$ the liability of a charitable hospital,
[the logic behind this rule] ... applies to all public charitable institu-
tions ... various homes for the aged.....4
Whether the extension of this doctrine should be made to cover other
related institutions such a$ nursing homes is questionable at this time.
However, if the populous must wait for the legislature to act, the court
may have to intervene as they did in Avellong. Certainly liability pro-
tection is no less available to the nursing home ihan it is to the urban
hospital and the injury no less onerous when it occurs late in life.
TORT LIABILITY OF OWNERS
AND POSSESSORS OF REAL PROPERTY
Persons on the Premises of Others
The survey period saw the publication of a number of decisions touch-
ing on the tort liability of owners and possessors of real property. Mor-
genstern v. Austin 5 offers a good point of departure into this area. The
30. 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E2d 563 (1960).
31. For complete discussions of the Gibbon case and its relation to the Avellone decision
see 74 HARV. L. REV. 614 (1961), and ii WEns. . L Rv. 680 (1960).
32. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
33. Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
34. 165 Ohio St. 467, 479, 135 N.E.2d 410, 418 (1956), (dissenting opinion).
35. 170 Ohio St. 113, 162 N.E.2d 849 (1959). See also discussion in Civil Procedure
section, p. 460 supra.
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action was instituted by the owner of a warehouse against his neighbor for
damage to his roof occasioned by children who used the defendant's shed
to gain access to the plaintiff's structure. According to the court the "es-
sential allegations" of the plaintiff's petition are as follows:
Plaintiff ... says that defendant has built said shed... as to violate the
rules and ordinances of the city of Cleveland ... , that said defendant
so constructed said shed as to cause it to be... an attractive nuisance
.... that young children are attracted to play about and on top of said
shed and thereby be able to crawl upon the plaintiff's warehouse build-
ing, causing much damage to be done to the same. 6
After commenting on the fact that the principal question before the court
was whether the trial judge erred in overruling defendant's motion for a
directed verdict the court went on to say:
An examination of the petition in the instant case demonstrates that the
action against the defendant is predicated solely upon the ground of
attractive nuisance. The doctrine of attractive nuisance has been repudi-
ated in Ohio .... Thus no matter what plaintiff pleads or proves she can
not recover under such doctrine in Ohio since she neither states nor
proved a cause of action.37
Although it is difficult to believe that the court actually meant what it
impliedly said, if this is the case, then the opinion raises several questions.
Prosser's Law of Torts devotes considerable space to clearing up the
many misnomers surrounding the subject of nuisance.3" One of the first
points that Dean Prosser makes in discussing nuisance is that a private
nuisance is the term applied to an unreasonable interference with the in-
terests of an individual in the use or enjoyment of land,"9 and that nui-
sance is a field of tort liability rather than a type of tortious conduct."0
Ohio lumps diverse conduct ranging from "anything which endangers life
or health" to "the wrongful invasion of personal rights"'" under the head-
ing of nuisance and follows the majority of jurisdictions in so doing. The
fact that Ohio recognizes a variety of conduct as constituting a nuisance
should have aided the plaintiff in the Morgenstern case. His structure
had been damaged directly as a result of the defendant's shed being used
as a "bridge" to his property. Furthermore, the shed had been built in
violation of the municipal building code and set-back ordinances which
suggests an action for perpetration of a private nuisance. To deny a re-
covery under these facts would suggest that Ohio is now committed to
follow the minority view that the plaintiff must resort to self-help in
36. Id. at 113, 162 N.E.2d at 850.
37. Id. at 115, 162 N.E.2d at 851.
38. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTs 389-426 (2d ed. 1955).
39. Id. at 389.
40. Id. at 391.
41. See 41 OHio JuR. 2d Nuisance § 1-14 (1960), especially § 2.
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abating a nuisance of this type rather than relying on the judicial
processes.
The pleading problem posed by this case will be commented upon in
detail elsewhere, but some mention should be made of the fact that the
court apparently found the descriptive term "attractive" a fatal defect in
plaintiff's petition. Read as a whole, the petition stated "a cause of action
sounding in nuisance." Therefore, the distinction between the use of the
term, "attractive" nuisance, in a descriptive sense and the "doctrine mak-
ing the occupier of land liable for conditions which are highly dangerous
to trespassing children,"'48 should have been clear. Whatever impact this
case may have on the law of nuisance in Ohio, one thing is apparent; if
the plaintiff is seeking to describe a type of nuisance he had better be sure
that no ambiguity arises through the use of the descriptive adjective,
"attractive."
Unlike the previous case involving trespass to land, Cornerford v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation" raises problems concerning indi-
viduals lawfully upon the land of another. In this case the court affirmed
the rule that where the general contractor does not have control over the
place of employment he is not liable for injuries sustained by the em-
ployee of a subcontractor. Involved in this case was Ohio's "frequenter"
statute which provides quite simply:
Every employer shall... furnish a place of employment which shall be
safe for the employees therein and the frequenters thereof .... 5
Passing on the question of whether the defendant, a general contractor,
owed the plaintiff a duty under the statute, the court wisely chose to re-
late an employer's duty to the question of whether the employer had con-
trol over the premises with respect to providing for the safety of the non-
employees. Judge Peck, in his opinion, noted that this was not a case
where the defendant knew of a dangerous condition and failed to warn
the plaintiff of the situation. Thus, it is control per se rather than mere
presence that raises the duty under the "frequenter" statute.
A third case under this particular heading suggests that even an ab-
ject tenant may on occasion have his day in court. Weidner v. Schotten-
stein48 involved an action brought by a tenant who inadvertently stepped
onto a defective cover of a sunken garbage can assigned to a fellow tenant
and suffered injuries occasioned by her percipetation downward. By way
of defense the landlord alleged that the tenant in proceeding to the apart-
ment from her garage, trespassed into an area exclusively in the posses-
42. See discussion in Civil Procedure section, p. 460 supra.
43. PRossaR, LAW OF TORTS 438 (2d ed. 1955).
44. 170 Ohio St. 117, 162 NE.2d 861 (1959).
45. Omo REv. CODE S 4101.11.
46. 169 NE.2d 304 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
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sion and control of her fellow tenant. The Court of Appeals for Frank-
lin County rejected the defense commenting: "... assuming, however,
that the plaintiff trespassed a few inches, that fact would not necessarily
bar recovery."4 The court accepted the majority view that while a land-
lord may be under no obligation to repair the leased premises he may
nevertheless be liable for damages sustained as a result of his negligence
in caring for the adjacent premises. Thus, the negligence of the defend-
ant and the possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff were for
the jury to decide.
Children at Large
In view of the fact that some states afford special recognition to the
rights, responsibilities, and propensitites of children, it seems appropriate
to treat the injured child under a separate heading. Although Ohio does
not follow the doctrine of "attractive nuisance,"4 notwithstanding the
protestations of some that it is the vanguard of the enlightened," a sepa-
rate treatment of a case arising this year suggests that the doctrine may
have some merit, Rose v. Lerkis," involved a two-year-old youngster who
was injured when she stepped onto a neighbor's new asphalt driveway.
The facts suggest that her plight was not discovered until someone noticed
her standing barefooted in the hot asphalt. The Court of Appeals for
Summit County in a short but pointed opinion found that (a) an inde-
pendent contractor is entitled to the same immunities from liability as is
the owner of the property upon which he is working, and (b) a child of
tender years, like any other licensee, takes the property as he finds it, save
for wanton or wilfull misconduct directed toward him. Although appar-
ently the plaintiff did not choose to allege it, a cause of action might have
been made out under the "frequenter" statute.51 However, in his attempt
to broaden the scope of the statute, counsel would have had to urge the
court to distinguish the Rose case from Morgan v. Wehrung." In that
case the plaintiff, following an evening of night dub entertainment
sought a ride home with a newly acquired friend who offered to meet
him at an adjacent parking ramp. After a somewhat belated arrival at
the ramp, the plaintiff, Morgan, instituted a search for his benefactor
which terminated in his subsequent fall from the building. The court
held that the "frequenter" statute did not apply.
Certainly the distinction between the wanderings of a two-year-old
47. Id. at 307.
48. 39 OHIO Jul. 2d Negligence § 75 (1959).
49. PROSSR, LAW OF TORTS 438 (2d ed. 1955).
50. 110 Ohio App. 100, 168 N.E.2d 422 (1958).
51. OmIo REv. CODE 5 4101.11.
52. 103 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
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child, one of a group of children playing in an abutting yard, and the
amblings of a gentleman, dazed from an evening of libation, can be made.
The mere fact that the statute was placed in the "Labor and Industry" sec-
tion of the Code does not preclude its use by those not of the working
class. If the legislature had this view in mind it would have restricted
the class benefited to "invitees" rather than the more inclusive term "fre-
quenters," which includes all save the trespasser.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE V. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A strong case for the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence53 may be made from an evaluation of the results achieved in Har-
per v. Henry.5" This action was brought for an eight-year-old who suf-
fered injuries received when a property owner, intent on trimming his
tree lawn, guided his power mower onto the public sidewalk and into
the path of the oncoming bicycle. In the resulting collision the boy was
thrown from the bicycle to the pavement, his hand entering the mower
casing and causing him severe injuries. The Court of Appeals for Stark
County found the jury's verdict for the property owner was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence and held that the jury had been proper-
ly instructed on the question of contributory negligence. Apparently three
factors mitigated against the plaintiff, namely, that he was riding (a) in
a "standing pumping" position, (b) at a "fast" rate of speed and (c)
"while looking down at the sidewalk." These factors coupled with the
following instructions by the court seemingly barred recovery:
... and [when] you reach this issue of contributory negligence, you
will determine whether the plaintiff used that care which a child of
ordinary care and prudence of the same age, education and experience
would use for his own safety... and in the event you find that the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to
cause his injury, the court charges you that the plaintiff would not be
entitled to recover in this law suit, even though you have found the de-
fenclant guilty of negligence which proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries. 55
Contributory negligence is an unfortunate term in several respects.
Its shortcoming lies in the fact that it does not allow the jurors to weigh
overtly the conduct of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Further, the
conduct which the term is to define is not negligence in that it does not
involve a specific breach of a duty owed by the actor to the injured party.
Thus, the plaintiff's smallest default in the care which he is exercising
for his own safety may deprive him of any recovery. Contributory fault"
53. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs 296-99 (2d ed. 1955).
54. 110 Ohio App. 233, 169 NE.2d 20 (1959).
55. Id. at 239, 169 N.E.2d at 25.
56. PRoss]R, LAw OF TORTs 285 (2d ed. 1955).
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would appear to be a more descriptive term for the undue risk to which
the plaintiff has exposed himself. A more equitable approach would
be to enact a statute similar to the one passed by the Wisconsin legisla-
ture in 1931:
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or in injury to person or property if such negligence was not
as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.57
WATER ENCROACHMENT
To date, the nation's water resources have been neglected with the re-
sult that little thought has been given to the subjects of use, misuse, and
re-use of this important resource. As man continues to reshape the con-
tour of the countryside and urbanize the nation's watershed at a rate of
a million acres a year, certain problems arise as are illustrated by four
recent Ohio cases.
The rights of village residents in the flow level of a watercourse run-
ning through their property was the subject of deliberation in Aubele v.
Galetovich.5" The petitioner sought to enjoin the defendants, a real es-
tate developer, three residents along a particular street, and the Village
of Seven Hills, from casting surface water and effluent from their septic
tanks into a common watercourse which flowed through the plaintiff's
property. After weighing the testimony of several expert witnesses to
the effect that the creek "emitted no offensive odor and did not contain
foreign matter, bacteria or e-coli in greater amount than in many other
similar streams" the court went on to observe:
A lower riparian owner, along a water course, must expect that, as the
upper lands are built up with homes and stores, much of the water
which was absorbed by the land will now run off of hard-surfaced
streets and roofs of buildings, to seek its natural outlet in the channel
developed with the contour of the land."
From the question of whether there has been an injury resulting in dam-
age to the plaintiff's rights, our attention is next turned to the question of
whether a municipality has the right to construct its storm sewer system
in such a way as to knowingly cause injury to the owners of lower lands
by causing an overflow to inundate the area. Oakwood Club v. City of
South Euclid 0 suggests that a municipality may do just that. The injury
in this case was by no means speculative, in that the plaintiff offered
57. Wis. STAT. § 331.045 (1958).
58. 165 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
59. Id. at 685.
60. 165 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Real Property section, p.
549 supra.
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proof to the effect that since 1947, following every rain storm, the low
lying areas of its golf course, including the area adjacent to the club
house, have been flooded to the detriment of the grounds and the fixtures.
Evidence was offered to show the club had sought to mitigate the damage
by deepening and widening the stream but that this had been to no avail.
Although there was argument both for and against the proposition that
waters outside the natural watershed served by the stream were being
cast upon the dub's lands, the court in its opinion made no attempt to
define the bounds of a watershed during a period in which the area is un-
dergoing a change in use. The term "watershed" to a geologist denotes
a three dimensional evaluation of an area including (a) boundaries, (b)
coverage as it relates to ability to hold, absorb, and transmit moisture and
(c) topography and over all surface gradient.
Ohio has not yet recognized the "capacity of the stream" rule61 which
provides that the flow of water may be increased as long as it does not go
beyond the natural capacity of the watercourse.6" However, it has been
accepted in other jurisdictions, and cognizance should be taken that the
rationale for the rejection of a particular doctrine must be re-examined un-
der the facts of each succeeding case. The law should not grant to real
estate speculators the right to profit while burdening municipalities and
subsequent purchasers with their latent mistakes.
A more pragmatic approach to the problem of the handling of sur-
face run-off as occasioned by urban build up is to be found in Boettler v.
Board of Township Trustees,63 wherein a resourceful farmer had stemmed
the "tide" from a newly constructed county airport by damming the en-
croaching waters and diverting their flow onto a country road. In apply-
ing what the court chose to call the "so called rural rule,"" subject to its
modern and common sense interpretation, the court took notice of the
following facts:
In the construction of said airport, ... hills were graded down to level
and gullies filled, and the level area resulting was hardsurfaced, . . .
and the surface waters which would naturally seep into the soil ...
or be disposed of by evaporation or other natural means . . . [were
directed and diverted onto the plaintiff's land].65
In weighing the respective equities, the court ordered engineers for both
parties to submit plans for abating the nuisance and assessed the cost of
the project to be borne proportionally, three-quarters by the county and
one-quarter by the landowner, but in so far as the owner is concerned the
61. Id. at 702.
62. 93 C.J.S. Waters 5 117 (1956).
63. 165 N.R2d 705 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
64. Id. at 708, 709. Contrast this with the reference to the "urban rule" at the same pageS.
65. Id. at 707.
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